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State Action Immunity:

A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit
Edison
Jeffrey Dorman*
Since Parker v. Brown, which declared states immune from antitrustlaws, the
courts have been engaged in defining the parameters of state action immunity. In
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., the Supreme Court has delineated the criteriato be
used for determining the applicability of state action immunity to a private individual acting pursuant to a state mandlhte. The author analyzes the Cantor standards and discusses the post-Cantorstatus of state action immunity.

I.

STATE ACTION IMMUNITY FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS

A MONG

VARIOUS EXEMPTIONS from the antitrust laws state action
immunity has proven to be one of the most controversial. Dating from
the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court appeared to have
conferred at least a limited exemption from the antitrust laws on three
classes of defendants: states, state officials, and private persons acting under the
direction of the state. 2 However, the Parker decision left two questions unanswered which were to plague the federal courts in later years. Were all

*B.A. (1971), University of Michigan; J.D. (1974), Case Western Reserve University; M.S.
(Economics) (1976), University of Wisconsin.
The author, an attorney with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, is presently a doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Wisconsin.
The views expressed in this article are entirely personal and do not necessarily represent, or
coincide with, those of any governmental agency.
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. The suit in Parker was filed against the State Director of Agriculture, a state commission, and a private group of citizens whose statutory duty was to create a restrictive marketing
program. The Parker decision did not make clear whether the Court considered this latter
group to be a private group or a state agency. However, subsequent lower federal cases made
clear that they considered Parkerapplicable to private parties acting under state direction. Gas
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three classes of potential immunees to be treated identically? If not, then
what standards were to be applied to each class? In its 1975 decision in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association,3 the Court indicated that the
three classes were not to be treated identically, stating that the immunity
conferred on state agents may be lost if the agent can be shown to have
acted outside of his grant of authority from the state. One year later, in the
landmark decision of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,4 the Court attempted to
delineate the standards and prerequisites which must be met by the third
class of immunees-private parties acting under the direction of the statein order to retain immunity. Although the Cantor decision appeared to have
caused more confusion than clarification, a more careful analysis of the case
demonstrates that the decision has made a significant contribution to resolving the unanswered questions of the Parker decision. This article attempts to
assess the current status of the state action immunity, to point out major
unanswered questions and issues that remain after Cantor, and to discuss
the legal consequences of suggested answers to those questions.
II.

SOURCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFUSION

A. Pre-Cantor Supreme Court Case Law
Any analysis of state action immunity must have its origins in the seminal
case of Parker v. Brown. 5 Pursuant to a California statute, the State Director of Agriculture created the California Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, which in turn created the Raisin Proration Program Committee.
These three parties then formulated, implemented, and enforced a restrictive raisin marketing program designed to stabilize the market price of
raisins by restricting competition in the sale of raisins. 6 A producer and
packer of raisins filed suit against these three parties, claiming, among other
Light Co. v. Georgia Power, 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361
F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1965).
3. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
4. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For an in depth discussion of Parker, see Handler, Twenty Fourth
Annual Antitrust Review: Parker v. Brown Revisted, 72 CoLum. L. REv. 4 (1972); Slater, Antitrust and Government Act: A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71
(1974); Comment, Governmental Action and Antitrust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 521
(1971); Jacobs, State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 221
(1975).
6. Under the provisions of the program the raisin crop of a producer was divided into
standard raisins and inferior raisins. In 1940, a producer was required to distribute 20 percent
of the standard raisins into the surplus raisin pool and 50 percent of these raisins into the
stabilization pool. The producer was permitted to dispose of the remaining 30 percent of his
standard raisins as be wished. The program committee determined the disposition of the raisins
in these two pools. However, the surplus pool was not to be sold in the normal distribution
market. Consequently, 20 percent of the standard raisin crop was eliminated from the market.
The raisins in the stabilization pool were to be disposed of in such manner as to maintain price.
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7
things, that this marketing scheme violated the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court stated that, while Congress presumably could have subjected states
8
and state officials to the provisions of the Sherman Act, the words and

history of the statute indicated that it was not intended to apply to actions of
the state. 9 The Court then held that the restrictive marketing scheme challenged was the action of the state, not of private individuals; therefore, the
Sherman Act could not reach the Raisin Proration Program. However, the
opinion left two important issues undecided.
First, while there was no question that the Advisory Commission was a
state agency, and the Court viewed it as such, it is unclear whether the
10
Court considered the Program Committee a state or a private agency. If
the Court viewed the Committee as a private agency, then the Parker doctrine would have immunized both a state agency (the Commission) and a
private agency that was acting pursuant to a legislative statute (the Committee). However, if the Court viewed the Committee as a, state agency, then
the Parker decision arguably has relevance only when dealing with state
agents but is not germane to cases involving private parties acting pursuant
to state direction.
Second, the Court failed to indicate what a state must do in order to
immunize a state agent or a private party. In one sense Parker was an extreme case. The California statute clearly contemplated that the Commission

and Committee would be able to institute anticompetitive programs. Howstability in the raisin market. The restriction of raisin supply and the monopoly of the
stabilization pooling mechanism had the effect of stabilizing raisin prices at a higher than competitive level. 317 U.S. at 347-49.
7. The plaintiff contended that this marketing agreement constituted a violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), in that the program constituted an
agreement in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize the raisin market.
8. Under the plenary grant of authority to the Congress under the commerce clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, there does not appear to be any constitutional limitation preventing the
Congress from extending the antitrust laws to the actions of the states. See concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3124 (1976). Thus,
the only question-to be answered is one of statutory construction as to whether Congress intended this broad a reach for the Sherman Act.
9. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman
Act declared that it prevented only "business combinations" . . . .
Here the state command to the Commission and to the program committee
...
of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the Sherman Act since, in
view of the latters words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of
individual and not state action.

Id. at 351.
10. In support of the Program Committee's status as a state agency it should be noted that
the Committee was created by state statute for the purpose of carrying out the statutory provisions. The Committee was compensated by the state for its services under section 18 of the Act
and was granted specific enforcement powers under section 24. California Agricultural Prorate
Act, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. art. 143a, §§ 18, 24 (Deering 1937).
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ever, the Court did not make clear whether a statute which was less specific
in its authorization of anticompetitive activity would suffice to invoke the
state action immunity.
Thus, after Parker only one thing was clear: a state official acting pursuant to a state statute which expressly authorized anticompetitive conduct
was immune from antitrust liability. However, Parker did not answer (1)
whether less specific authorization would also immunize a state official, or (2)
whether the same type of authorization that immunizes a state official would
also immunize a private party acting pursuant to state direction.
In practical terms these two issues were to prove crncial. Subsequent
lower federal court immunity cases involved state utilities charged with anticompetitive practices. The utilities claimed state action immunity under
Parker because they were regulated by state public utility commissions. Not
knowing whether Parker applied to private utilities or whether regulation by
a state public service commission was sufficient state direction to grant immunity to private parties, the federal circuits were wildly inconsistent in
their treatment of this immunity."
In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Corp.12 the Court indicated that
more stringent standards were required for a state to immunize a private
party. While the Parker Court had at least held that express authorization to
engage in anticompetitive conduct was sufficient to immunize a state agent,
the Schwegmann Court indicated in dicta that such express authorization
would not immunize private parties."3

However, in support of the Committee's status as a private body, the Committee was composed of raisin producers with a pecuniary interest in the very program they devised. The
Committee members were nominated by the raisin producers and chosen (from among those
nominated) by the State Director of Agriculture; thus, the selection method had elements of
both state and private selection. Finally, the actual enforcement powers of the Committee were
not delegated to the Committee in the statute itself, as would be the case with most state
agencies, but instead had to rely on the Director of Agriculture for its delegation of responsibilities.
For these reasons the Committee took on the appearance of a quasi-state and quasi-private
agency. However, there is little doubt that the Cantor plurality viewed the Committee as a
state agency.
11. Compare Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971), with Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power, 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971) and Duke &
Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
12. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
13. "Therefore, when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands
private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389. In all probability the Court in
Schwegmann intended to cite to that page of the Parker opinion wherein the Court stated: "[A]
state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). Apparently, this
is how the Schwegmann Court interpreted the actions of Louisiana-that it declared an otherwise illegal price maintenance scheme lawful. The Court in Cantor cited Schwegmann for the
proposition that even where the state makes possible, without requiring, an anticompetitive
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Twenty-four years after Schwegmann the Supreme Court heard Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar Association.1 4 Due to the existence of a minimum fee
schedule that had been promulgated by the Fairfax County Bar Association
and enforced' 5 by the Virginia State Bar Association, the plaintiffs were unable to find a Virginia lawyer who would perform a required title search for
less than the minimum fee stipulated by the County Bar Association. Consequently, the plaintiffs filed suit against both the State and County Bar
Associations, claiming that the promulgation and enforcement of the
minimum fee schedule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The State Bar
Association claimed that by enforcing the County Bar Association's minimum
fee schedule it was doing nothing more than implementing the Virginia Supreme Court's ethics code provisions relating to minimum fee schedules. 16
Since the State Bar Association was authorized to enforce the ethics provisions of the Virginia State Bar Association, the State Bar claimed immunity
under Parker. Despite the fact that the State Bar Association was a state'
agency under Virginia law, 17 the Supreme Court denied it immunity from
the Sherman Act, stating:
scheme, this will not immunize private parties acting pursuant to the state statute. 96 C. Ct. at
3118.
In the years intervening between Schwegmann and Cantor there was a notable increase in
the number of cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
which involved an expansive definition of official action under color of state law. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965);
Marshal v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). In expanding the meaning of official action in
civil rights cases, the Court made periodic pronouncements that the requirements for state
action in civil rights cases had no relationship to state action in antitrust cases. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power- Co., 460 F.2d 638, 654 n.35 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114
(1973).
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court discussed the requirements for state action in civil rights cases and used a "of." cite to antitrust cases wherein
the Court made clear that no expansion of state action in civil rights cases was to have any effect
on the narrow interpretation that the Court had used in Schwegmann. Id. at 349 n.6.
14. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15. The Virginia State Bar Association had "enforced" the minimum fee schedule to the
extent that, in its opinions, it indicated that habitual failure to comply with local minimum fee
schedules raised a presumption of misconduct. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S.
773, 776-78 (1975).
16. Under the Virginia regulatory scheme plenary power to regulate the practice of law is
granted to the state supreme court. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974). The State Bar Association
may be vested, by the supreme court, with sufficient power to enforce the rules and regulations
promulgated by the supreme court. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974):
Organizationand government of Virginia State Bar-The Supreme Court may,
from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations of
organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia State Bar, composed
of the attorneys-at-law of this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court
for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court ....
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974) refers to the State Bar Association as an administrative
agency.
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The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign.... [A]lthough the [Virginia] Supreme Court's ethical
codes mention advisory fee schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or require the type of price floor which
arose from respondents' activities.... It is not enough that as the
County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is "prompted" by state
action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' 8
Given the Court's choice of wording in the above quote, there are two
plausible interpretations of Goldfarb's effect on the state action immunity
doctrine as it relates to state officials. First, it is possible that Goldfarb was
intended to partially overrule Parker. In Parker, while the statute clearly
authorized the state agents to implement an anticompetitive marketing program, in no way could the state have been said to have compelled the adoption of such a program. At the very least Parker stands for the proposition
that the actions of a state agent which are clearly authorized by the state are
immune from antitrust liability. 19 If Goldfarb actually intended to require
that a state must compel the anticompetitive activities of its agents before
the agent may claim state action immunity, Goldfarb would represent a significant restriction of the state action immunity vis-a-vis state agents.
However, a second, and more plausible, interpretation of Goldfarb is
that, due to peculiarities in the Virginia enabling statute, the Court determined that the State Bar Association had acted outside of the scope of the
authority granted to it by the state, and that a state agent acting ultra vires
should be treated as a private party insofar as the application of state action
immunity is concerned. Under the Virginia statutory scheme, plenary power
to regulate the practice of law is granted to the Virginia Supreme Court.
Beyond this plenary granting of authority, the statutory scheme permits the
Virginia Supreme Court to vest the State Bar Association with sufficient authority to enforce provisions of its regulations.20 Thus, there is. reason to
require that the State Bar Association point to direct authorization from the
state supreme court in order to avoid the claim that the action taken was
ultra vires. Once the Court viewed the Bar Association as a private party,
then the "compelled action" standard enunciated by the Court would be
applicable. This reading of the case is supported by the fact that the com-

18. 421 U.S. at 790-91 (emphasis added).
19. This does not mean that Parker implies that one cannot sue a state to preempt state
action which interferes with the policy of the Sherman Act. It only means that one cannot sue
the state for injunction under the Sherman Act itself. However, preemption standards are more
stringent.
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-48, 54-49 (1974).
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pelled action standard was later repeated in the Court's Cantor decision,
which dealt with immunity for private individuals who claimed to be acting
pursuant to state direction. 21 Therefore, it appears that the Court merely
found that the State Bar Association had acted ultra vires and proceeded to
22
treat the Association as a private party asking for immunity.
This second interpretation of Goldfarb accords more logically with the
policy behind Parker, with the wording of the Goldfarb Court, and with the
later Cantor opinion, than does the first interpretation. Most state regulatory statutes which delegate to some regulatory agency the authority to regulate a market are not drafted with such specificity that a given action can be
said to have been compelled. For example, the California statute in Parker
did not expressly compel the behavior that was held to be immune by the
Court. Such a requirement would place an onerous burden on the state and
would negate many of the advantages of creating a regulatory agency with
special expertise to consider various problems in a market that is outside of
the legislature's competence.
The rationale of Parker seems to imply that the! state should have the
right to delegate, to the limits of constitutionality, any regulatory powers
that the state itself might exercise. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of Goldfarb to even suggest that the Court was intending to overrule
Parker. Yet, the first interpretation of Goldfarb would necessarily overrule
Parker to the extent that mere express authorization would no longer be
sufficient to confer immunity on the state agent. Finally, there is logical
consistency in requiring that a state agent acting ultra vires meet the same
criteria that must be met by private parties as those criteria are set out in
Cantor. In fact, it is not sensible, given the rationale of Parker, to require a
state to use the same restrictive standards in delegating authority to its own
agents that it must use in delegating authority to its private citizens.
The specific wording and analysis of the Court lends firther credence to
the second interpretation. In discussing the effect of the State Bar Association's status as a state agency the Court states:
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-579 (1973). The State Bar, by

21. 96 S. Ct. at 3121.
22. It would seem that if it were determined that the state agent acted ultra vires, and thus
were treated as if he were a private party, under Cantor he could not successfully argue that
his actions were compelled by the State. However, the effect of viewing the agent as a private
party under Cantor, rather than just concluding that there is no immunity from the antitrust
laws, is that there could still be immunity from treble damage liability if there were a showing
of good faith. See note 47 infra.
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providing that deviation from County Bar minimum fees may lead
to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a
private anticompetitive activity, and in that23 posture cannot claim it
is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
The statement that the State Bar is a "state agency for some limited purposes" is analytically close to the statement that the Virginia Supreme Court
has endowed the State Bar with limited authority. Similarly the statement
that the State Bar has joined in an essentially private (vs. governmental)
activity suggests that the Court found that the Bar, acting as such, was no
longer fimctioning as a governmental agency. An identical characterization
would be that the Bar had exceeded its authority and was acting ultra vires.
It was apparent on the face of the Virginia statute that the state had not
compelled the Bar Association to enforce minimum fee schedules. From an
analytical viewpoint, therefore, if the Court had intended to require that the
state compel anticompetitive conduct in order to confer immunity, it was
unnecessary to discuss whether the State Bar Association had acted outside
of the scope of its role as a "state agency for some limited purpose." That
portion of the Court's analysis would have been superfluous.
In summary, the better interpretation of Goldfarb is that it demonstrates
that state agents who act outside of their grant of authority lose the
privileged status established in Parker and are relegated to the role of a
24
private party claiming to be acting under direction of the state.

B. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 25 the Court's latest statement on the

23. 421 U.S. at 791-92 (1975) (footnotes omitted). The citation to Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973), is potentially important. In Gibson, the Court held that a state board of optometrists could not sit as jury in a state regulatory delicensing hearing because the board
member optometrists had a financial interest in removing the licenses of other optometrists in
order to gain the patients which would be lost by the potentially delicensed optometrists. A
"of." cite to a case indicates that the cited authority supports a statement, opinion, or conclusion of law different from that in the text but sufficiently analogous to lend some support to the
text. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 7 (12th ed. 1976). Since Gibson stands for the proposition that a group of persons with a systematic financial interest in the outcome of an adjudicatory proceeding cannot (consistent with due process) constitute an independent agency of the
state for purposes of hearing the case, the of. cite to Gibson in Goldfarb arguably implies that a
regulatory group with a systematic financial interest (such as the Virginia State Bar) in the
profession being regulated cannot constitute an independent agency of the state for purposes of
immunity.
24. It should be noted that, if the Court actually intended to require that a state mandate
the conduct of its agents before those agents could claim immunity, the Virginia Supreme Court
might well have been liable for treble damages since the enabling statute did not mandate that
the Virginia Supreme Court promulgate minimum fee schedules.
25. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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proper application of the state action immunity, attempts to set standards for
the application of this immunity when dealing with private parties acting
under the direction of the state. The defendant in Cantor was a utility company firnishing electric power to southern Michigan. As part of its services,
the defendant maintained a light bulb exchange program through which new
residential customers were provided incandescent bulbs in such quantities as
were needed for all permanent fixtures. Thereafter, as a bulb burned out,
the utility would replace it with a new one free of charge. The bulb distribution program was approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission as
part of the tariff filed by the defendant and could not be changed or withdrawn by the defendant until a new tariff was approved. The plaintiff, a
retail druggist who sold light bulbs, claimed that the bulb distribution program was a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 6 A majority of the
Court, consisting of six justices, held that the state action immunity doctrine
did not apply, despite the regulation by the Public Service Commission.
Unfortunately, these six justices splintered into three groups. The plurality
opinion, written by Justice Stevens, carried the weight of five justices on
some issues but only four justices on the other issues. Chief Justice Burger,
who agreed with only a portion of the plurality opinion, filed his own concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun, who disagreed entirely with Justice Stevens' approach, also wrote a separate concurring opinion.
1. Justice Stevens' Opinion
Justice Stevens' opinion is divided into four parts. Parts I and III carried
a majority of five votes, while Parts II and IV carried only four votes.
a. Part II (4 votes). In Part II, Justice Stevens read Parker narrowly as
applying only to actions of the state or of state officials acting pursuant to
express legislative command. 27 Under this interpretation, Parker does not

26. It was claimed that the light bulb exchange program constituted an attempt to
monopolize the light bulb market, a violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the
original complaint the plaintiff also alleged that the program constituted an illegal tying arrangement whereby the utility was attempting to use its natural monopoly in the retail electric
power market to obtain a monopoly in the market for light bulbs. However, this latter allegation was dropped. No explanation was given for dropping the tying theory. A possible explanation is that a Sherman Act section I allegation requires proof of an agreement or conspiracy. 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Since the damage award would, presumably, be identical under either the
section 1 or section 2 allegation, there was no need for the plaintiff to subject himself to the
additional burden of showing a conspiracy or agreement.
27. The briefs submitted by the parties to the Supreme Court in Parkerlend credence to
Justice Stevens' reading of Parker. In the initial briefs both parties addressed the issues of
whether the California statute was an undue burden on interstate commerce and whether the
state statute was preempted by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, U.S.C. §§
601-24, 641-59 (1970). However, the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefs on the issue of
whether the California statute was preempted by the Sherman Act. Despite the specificity of
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apply unless (1) the defendant is either the state or a state official, and (2)
the alleged antitrust violation is a state statute or action taken pursuant to an
express legislative command. 28 Since the Detroit Edison Company was a
private utility, Justice Stevens refused to apply the Parker doctrine. However, it is essential that one not misread this section; it does not state or
imply that private action pursuant to state mandate cannot be exempt from
the antitrust laws. It merely states that Parker is not germane to any case
wherein the defendant is a party other than the state or a state official.
b. Parts III (5 votes) and IV (4 votes). Despite his refusal to apply
Parker in this case, Justice Stevens indicated that there might be instances
in which private conduct that is required by state law should be exempt
from the antitrust laws, and he established standards for granting immunity
in such cases. In the portion of his opinidn setting these standards Justice
Stevens stated:
In this case we are asked to hold that private conduct required
by state law is exempt from the Sherman Act. Two quite different
reasons might support such a rule. First, if a private citizen has
done nothing more than obey the command of his state sovereign,
it would be unjust to conclude that he has thereby offended federal
law. Second, if the State is already regulating an area of the
economy, it is arguable that Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as an additional, and perhaps conflicting,
regulatory mechanism. We consider these two reasons separately.
We may assume, arguendo, that it would be unacceptable ever
to impose statutory liability on a party who had done nothing more
than obey a state command ...
Apart from the question of fairness to the individual who must
conform not only to state regulation but to the federal antitrust
laws as well, we must consider whether Congress intended to
superimpose antitrust standards on conduct already being regulated under a different standard....
... First, merely because certain conduct may be subject both
to state regulation and to the federal antitrust laws does not neces-

the request, neither party briefed the preemption issue under the Sherman Act. Instead, both
parties briefed the issue of whether the state had violated the Sherman Act. The only brief
submitted that dealt with the preemption issue was by the United States as amicus. In this brief
the United States stated: "But the question we face here is not whether California or its officials
have violated the Sherman Act, but whether the state program interferes with the accomplishment of the objectives of the federal statute." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 59,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
28. Presumably, the legislative command language is incorrect. It would appear from the
rationale of Parker that the command could come in the form of an executive order, a statute,
an administrative agency regulation, or a mandamus. Since the executive and judicial branches
are co-equal branches with the legislature, there does not appear to be a rational basis for
restricting the power to authorize to the legislature.
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sarily mean that it must satisfy inconsistent standards; second, even
assuming inconsistency, we could not accept the view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's; and.
finally, even if we vere to assume that Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy primarily regulated
by a State, that assumption would not foreclose the enforcement of
the antitrust laws in an essentially unregulated area .... 29
The structure and language employed by Justice Stevens are susceptible to
at least two interpretations.
One plausible interpretation of this language is that a private defendant
may qualify for state action immunity under either of two separate and distinct tests. First, if the defendant can demonstrate that his behavior was
required by the state (where the decision to require the anticompetitive
conduct was that of the state), 30 the private defendant qualifies for immunity
under the first test. Second, if the defendant cannot qualify for immunity
under the first test, he may qualify under a second test by showing that (a)
the state statute or regulation mandating the conduct is part of a regulatory
scheme that is repugnant to the antitrust laws, (b) the granting of immunity
is essential to maintenance of the regulatory scheme, 31 and (c) the state's
interest in maintaining the regulatory scheme is sufficiently primary to justify tbwarting the federal policy of the antitrust laws.
A second interpretation of the quoted language is that Justice Stevens
created only one test-for immunity for private conduct mandated by the
state. Under this interpretation a private defendant claiming state action
immunity would have to demonstrate that (a) his actions were compelled by
the state via a statute or regulation wherein the state's role in formulating
the statute or regulation was predominant, (b) the state statute or regulation
mandating the conduct is part of a regulatory scheme that is repugnant to
the antitrust laws, (c) the granting of immunity is essential to maintenance of
the regulatory scheme, and (d) the state's interest in maintaining the regulatory scheme is sufficiently primary to justify thwarting the federal policy of
the antitrust laws.
The prime difference between the first and second interpretation is that
the requirement that the defendant's actions be compelled by the state
via a statute or regulation, wherein the state's role in formulating the statute

29. 96 S. Ct. at 3117-19.
30. One of the most important rationales for the decision in Cantor was that the decision to
institute a light bulb exchange program was that of the defendant, not of the state. As the Court
stated: "Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such a
program is primarily respondent's, not the Commission's." Id. at 3118.
31. This second requirement, while not specifically enunciated by Justice Stevens, is a traditional companion to the first in the primary jurisdiction cases. See notes 73-74 infra and accompanying text.
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or regulation was predominant, under the second interpretation is merely
one of four necessary conditions, but is not sufficient alone to confer immunity. However, under the first interpretation this first condition is sufficient
by itself to insure immunity. For the purpose of referencing this first condition it shall be referred to hereinafter as the "first condition."
Those who urge the first interpretation derive support from the wording
and structure of Justice Stevens' opinion. Justice Stevens does state that
there are two separate reasons for granting immunity to conduct mandated
by the state. Moreover, he goes to considerable length to demonstrate, first,
that the activity of Detroit Edison was not mandated by the state, and second, that the light bulb exchange program was not necessary to the state's
regulatory scheme. 32 An entirely reasonable argument put forth by those
who urge the first interpretation is that if indeed the first condition is an
integral part of one test and not a separate test, then once the Court had
demonstrated that Detroit Edison had failed the first condition it was not
necessary to analyze whether Detroit Edison had failed any of the remaining
three conditions. Only if the first condition and the remaining three conditions constitute separate immunity tests was it essential for the Court to
analyze whether Detroit Edison had failed both the first condition and any
of the other conditions. However, despite the reasonableness of these arguments, the first interpretation will not withstand a careful reading of Cantor
and Goldfarb.
Justice Stevens did not specifically state that the first condition is a separate test. In paragraph two of Part III, he stated: "We may assume, arguendo, that it would be unacceptable ever to impose statutory liability on a
party who had done nothing more than obey a state command." 33 Thus, the
Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the first condition was a separate test without actually so deciding. Justice Stevens then went on to state
that even if this were a separate test, Detroit Edison would not meet it.
Therefore, the Court never had 'to reach the point of deciding whether the
first condition was a separate test. However, a logical question is posed by%
proponents of the first interpretation: Why did the Court segregate the first
condition from the other three in its analysis if it did not consider the first
requirement a separate test? A highly probable answer is to be found in the
fact that Detroit Edison argued in its brief that it should be immune render
34
the Parker doctrine if it had done nothing more than obey a state order.
Since Justice Stevens found that Detroit Edison had not merelh obeyed a

32. "Regardless of the outcome of this case, Michigan's interest in regulating its utilities
distribution of electricity will be almost entirely unimpaired." 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
33. Id. at 3118.
34. Brief for Respondent at 23, Cantor %. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976.
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state order, it was easy to dispose of one of the defendant's key arguments
without detailing a specific test. In any case, the argument that had the
Court actually considered the four conditions to be a single test it would
have ended its inquiry as soon as determining that Detroit Edison had failed
the first condition is not persuasive. Given the fact that the test proposed in
Cantor had never been enunciated before, it was incumbent upon the Court
to analyze whether Detroit Edison's activities met any of the four conditions
which the Court established as the test for conferring immunity in order to
give some indication of the standards that the Court would apply in analyzing whether future situations met all of these conditions. Thus, there was
every reason for the Court to fully analyze Detroit Edison's conduct vis-a-vis
each separate condition even if failure to meet the first condition was sufficient to refuse immunity.
In addition to negating the rationales put forward by the proponents of
the first interpretation, there are affirmative reasons for rejecting it. Justice
Stevens' apparent reading of Goldfarb makes the first interpretation untenable. In Part IV of his opinion, Justice Stevens cited to and paraphrased the
language in Goldfarb: "The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign." 35 If the first condition is the "threshold inquiry" of Goldfarb,
that characterization implies that it is nothing more than the first condition
in a test which contains other conditions. This would make the first interpretation of Justice Stevens' opinion inaccurate.
However, in fairness to proponents of the first interpretation, there is
one reading of Goldfarb's threshold inquiry which would make the first interpretation plausible. It is clear that the first condition actually engenders
two subconditions: (a) that the state require the defendant's activity, and (b)
that the decision to require the activity come from the state.36 It is not clear
from the language of Goldfarb whether the "threshold" inquiry includes
both of the subconditions or only subcondition a. If the threshold inquiry
encompasses both, it is equivalent to the first condition. This makes the first
interpretation of Justice Stevens' opinion untenable since the first condition
would not be a separate test but, rather, would be only a threshold inquiry.
On the other hand, if the threshold inquiry engenders only subcondition a,
then the first interpretation of Justice Stevens' opinion is viable. Under this
latter reading of Goldfarb, the threshold inquiry is whether the state required the defendant's activity (subcondition a of the first condition), and the

35. 96 S. Ct. at 3121 n.41, quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 790
(1975) (emphasis added).
36. See note 30 supra.
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remainder of the test is whether the decision to require the activity came
from the state (subcondition b). The issue, then, would be whether Justice
Stevens read the threshold requirement in Goldfarb as engendering both
subconditions or only the first.
It is clear from Justice Stevens' statement of the facts at the beginning of
the case that Detroit Edison was compelled by law to continue the light
bulb exchange program. 37 Therefore, in his discussion of whether Detroit
Edison met the first condition, Justice Stevens addressed himself solely to
the question of whether the primary source of the decision to institute the
program came from the state or from the private party. 38 After deciding that
it was Detroit Edison itself which primarily initiated the program, Justice
Stevens concluded that the first condition had not been met and therefore
the immunity did not attach. It is clear, therefore, that Justice Stevens' formulation of his first condition includes both (a) that the state require the
activity, and (b) that the decision to require the activity come from the state.
The Goldfarb case gave no clue as to the proper interpretation of its
threshold inquiry; the Court found that the state had not "required" enforcement of minimum fee schedules in any sense. However, there is strong
evidence that Justice Stevens read the threshold requirement of Goldfarb as
encompassing both subconditions. First, there is a marked similarity between Justice Stevens' language regarding "a party who had done nothing
more than obey a state command" (the first condition), and the Goldfarb
language regarding "activity required by the State acting as sovereign" (the
threshold inquiry). Arguably, such similar language is intended to convey
similar meaning. This would imply that Justice Stevens read the threshold
requirement as being equivalent to the first condition of his test, including
both subconditions.
Justice Stevens quoted the threshold requirement from Goldfarb as if to
say that Detroit Edison's activity, though mandated under the tariff, did not
meet even that requirement. There was no question that Detroit Edison's
conduct was required by the state, thereby meeting subcondition a. Thus, if
the threshold requirement engendered only subcondition a, Justice Stevens
would have found that Detroit Edison had met the threshold requirement.
On the other hand, if Detroit Edison met subcondition a but failed subcondition b, and if Detroit Edison (under Justice Stevens' view) had failed to
meet the threshold requirement, it must be because the threshold requirement included both subconditions a and b. Moreover, Justice Stevens
clearly indicated that Detroit Edison failed subcondition b.3 9 Thus, even

37. 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
38. Id. at 3118.
39. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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though one could argue that the threshold inquiry of Goldfarb refers only to
subcondition a, the more persuasive view is that Justice Stevens read the
threshold requirement of Goldfarb to include both subconditions a and b.
Thus, it would seem that Justice Stevens viewed the first condition in Cantor as merely a threshold requirement, which is consistent with the second
interpretation of his opinion but wholly inconsistent with the first interpreta40
tion.
There are, in addition, problems in harmonizing the first interpretation
with other sections of the opinion. The first section of Part IV of Justice
Stevens' opinion deals with immunity from treble damage liability. It appears that Justice Stevens is saying that although there may be an antitrust
violation, a private party who was only obeying a command that was substantially formulated by the state may be exempt from the treble damage
provision. However, this is precisely the first test in the first interpretation
of Justice Stevens' opinion, designed to grant total immunity-immunity
from injunctive relief as well as from treble damage liability. If the Court
can use this same test to declare the private party totally immune from
antitrust attack, then there is no need to talk about immunity from treble
damage liability. One could argue that there may be instances wherein the
state's participation in the activity is not sufficient to confer total immunity
41
but may be enough to raise issues of fairness in imposing treble damages;
however, there is little support for this explanation anywhere in the opinion.
Finally, Justice Stevens' own reading of congressional intent further supports the second interpretation of his opinion. In discussing the second or
alternate immunity test of the first interpretation, Justice Stevens stated:
"[W]e must consider whether Congress intended to superimpose antitrust
standards on conduct already being regulated." 42 He then concluded that
immunity should not be granted unless all three conditions comprising that
second test were met because Congress intended to preempt state regulations that conflict with the antitrust laws if they do not meet these three
criteria. 43 However, under the first interpretation, there may be instances
wherein a state regulation meets the first condition and is thereby vested

40. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that Justice Stevens meant that
Detroit Edison had met the threshold requirement but failed the remainder of the test; however, this is unlikely. If Justice Stevens was stating that Detroit Edison bad failed a condition
other than the threshold requirement, the opinion should have gone on to describe where
Detroit Edison's activity failed. However, the opinion does not do this, suggesting that it was
the threshold requirement that was failed.
41. The argument is a reasonable one. The courts are aware that their standards for determining whether state participation is sufficient to warrant total immunity are vague. Therefore,
the courts may be inclined to give an antitrust defendant the benefit of the doubt with respect
to treble damage liability.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
43. See note 8 supra. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
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with immunity even though it fails at least one of the other three conditions
which comprise the second test. Proponents of the first interpretation would
grant immunity in this situation, despite the fact that Justice Stevens
seemed to view Congress as having intended to preempt state regulations
44
which do not meet all of the final three conditions.
For these reasons the first interpretation is invalid, and it is the second
interpretation which Justice Stevens probably intended. The second interpretation presents a logical approach to the problem. Before granting
state action immunity, two prerequisites are required: first, that the action
actually be state action (guaranteed by the first condition), and second, that
Congress have intended for the state to be able to enact such conflicting
legislation (guaranteed by the final three requirements). This would appear
to be what Justice Stevens had in mind when he stated: "Certainly that
careful use of language [the threshold inquiry in Goldfarb] could not have
been read as a guarantee that a compliance with any state requirement
45
would automatically confer federal antitrust immunity."
The final portion (Part IV) of Justice Stevens' opinion is a confusing
amalgam of disjointed threads left hanging by the first three parts. Justice
Stevens first considered the guidelines to be used to grant protection to a
nonexempt defendant from treble damage liability. While the decision is far
from clear, Justice Stevens appears to suggest that if a private defendant
either met the threshold condition of Goldfarb or "had engaged in anticompetitive conduct in reliance on a justified understanding that such conduct
was immune from the antitrust laws, a concern with the punitive aspects of
46
the treble damage remedy would be appropriate.Thus, it appears that the opinion states a fairly restrictive test for granting total immunity (both treble damage and injunctive immunity) to a private defendant acting under state mandate; however, it also seems that Justice Stevens might be willing to grant treble damage immunity if the
threshold requirement of Goldfarb were met. 47 Such an interpretation of

44. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Specifically, if Congress intended to preempt state statutes which
failed to meet any of the three requirements in the second test (and assuming that Congress
had sufficient authority under the commerce clause to do so), then state statutes which cannot
meet the requirements should be preempted under the supremacy clause.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 312.2.
46. Id. at 3121.
47. It cannot be said unequivocally that Justice Stevens was stating that there would be a
dichotomy created so as to treat immunity from injunctive relief and from treble damage relief
separately. In fact, Justice Stevens said in a footnote that the need for fairness when granting
treble damage relief, despite a showing of good faith, sparked Congress to attempt to amend
the antitrust law to allow for discretionary application of treble damage relief. 96 S. Ct. at 3121
n.39. However, the language quoted in the text seems to imply that the Court itself, out of
concern for fairness, might create this dichotomy. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,
expressly states this latter reading to be correct. Id. at 3128 n.6.
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Cantor is a far more compatible blending of Parts III and IV than is possible
under the first interpretation of Justice Stevens' opinion.
2. Justice Burger's Opinion
Justice Burger concurred in Parts I and III of Justice Stevens' opinion.
However, he disagreed with Justice Stevens' analysis of Parker, suggesting
that Parker stood not only for immunity for states and state officials but also
for private action pursuant to state mandate. His concurrence was based on
the thesis that Michigan was neutral to the light bulb exchange program;
thus, the state never mandated participation in the program. It is tempting
to argue that, since he concurred in Part III, Justice Burger agreed with the
test set out by Justice Stevens for determining the application of the immunity. However, this assumption would be too sweeping. It is possible,
perhaps likely, that Justice Burger felt that if the private defendant met the
four conditions of what is urged to be the Stevens test, the action should be
exempt under Parker, because the test encompasses Parker immunity. But
this is not certain, and it is of little consequence whether the immunity
stems from Parker or whether it stems from Justice Stevens' opinion. Finally, Justice Burger did not speak to the issue of whether a nonimmunized
private defendant can claim protection from treble damage suits.
3. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
Perhaps the most curious approach was Justice Blackmun's. After reviewing several antitrust decisions, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court
has in the past held and "Congress itself has given support to the view that
inconsistent state laws are preempted by the Sherman Act." 48 In discussing
his approach to the facts presented in Cantor vis-a-vis his preemption
theory, Justice Blackmun stated:
I would apply at least for now, a rule of reason, taking it as a
general proposition that state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity
must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits.
This does not mean that state-sanctioned and private activity are to
be treated alike. The former is different because the fact of state
sanction figures powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit. If,
for example, the justification for the scheme lies in the protection
of health or safety, the strength of that justification is forcefully
attested to by the existence of a state enactment. I would assess
the justifications of such enactments in the same way as is done in
equal protection review, and where such justifications are at all
substantial (as one would expect them to be in the case of most
professional licensing or fee-setting schemes . . .), I would be re48. Id. at 3125.
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luctant to find the restraint unreasonable. A particularly strong justification exists for a state-sanctioned scheme if the State in effect
has substituted itself for the forces of competition, and regulates
private activity9 to the same ends sought to be achieved by the
4
Sherman Act.
It is difficult to assess how different this approach is in practice from that
of the other two opinions. It is possible that this test requires, as a
minimum, satisfaction of conditions 2, 3, and 4 of the Stevens test. In the
final footnote of his opinion Justice Blackmun asserts, as arguably does Justice Stevens, that there may be cases in which a nonimmune private defendant may be protected from treble damage recovery. 50
4. Synthesis
It is important to be aware that all language and tests as to whether a
party should be immunized from the reaches of the antitrust laws or from
treble damage recovery are pure dicta. The real holding of the case is that a
majority of six justices voted that the actions of Detroit Edison Company
were not immunized from the antitrust laws-using whatever test each justice applied. This does not necessarily imply that, were a private defendant
to meet Justice Stevens' four conditions or Justice Blackmun's balancing test,
the Court would be compelled to grant immunity. However, the dicta in
this case serve as a valuable guide in determining what factors the Court
finds important in granting immunity. Based on the foregoing analysis and
making the leap of faith necessary to infer from Justice Burger's concurrence
in Parts I and III of Justice Stevens' opinion that he assents to the fourcondition test for immunity, it is possible to derive the following principles
from Cantor:
Principles Carrying the. Concurrence of Five Justices:
1. A private defendant acting pursuant to state mandate may receive
immunity from the antitrust laws if:
a. his actions were compelled by the state via a statute or regulation
wherein the state's role in formulating the statute or regulation was
predominant,
b. the state statute or regulation mandating the conduct is part of a
regulatory scheme that is repugnant to the antitrust laws,
c. the granting of immunity is essential to maintenance of the regulatory scheme, and
d. the state's interest in maintaining the regulatory scheme is suffi49. Id. at 3126-27.
50. Id. at 3128.
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ciently primary to justify thwarting the federal policy of the antitrust
laws.
2. A defendant whose behavior is made more susceptible to antitrust
prosecution by state regulation or who relied in good faith on the
belief that his behavior was immunized by the state may be subject
to injunctive suit but not to treble damage action under the antitrust
51
laws.
Principles Carrying the Concurrence of Fewer Than Five Justices:
1. The Parker doctrine is limited to cases in which the defendant is
either a state or a state official and the action challenged is either a
statute or official action pursuant to an express legislative mandate.
2. There is a rebuttable presumption that Congress intends to preempt
state statutes that are inconsistent with the anttrust laws. The presumption may be rebutted by demonstrating that there is a rational
basis for the state's regulatory scheme where the state is regulating in
an area (such as health or safety) which is a traditional area of state
concern.
III. THE STATUS OF STATE ACTION IMMUNITY
AFTER GOLDFARB AND CANTOR

There can be no doubt that the state action immunity doctrine has undergone considerable reform within the past two years due to the Goldfarb
and Cantor decisions. Prior to these cases most commentators and lower
federal courts had interpreted the Parker doctrine as immunizing not only
52
states and state agents but also private parties subject to state regulation.
This has been changed by these two cases. The previous section discussed
Goldfarb and Cantor in order to determine what changes the Court intended to make with these two cases. However, major questions still remain, and these will be discussed in the following sections.
A. Issues Remaining After Goldfarb
If Goldfarb and Cantor indicate nothing else, they do indicate that the
Supreme Court recognizes the differences between the three classes of immunees: the state, state agents, and private parties acting under the direction of the state. 53 Given that the rationale for state action immunity is that
51. See note 47 supra.
52. See cases cited in note 11 supra. See also Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129
(5th Cir. 1975).
53. See PART I of this article supra (notes 1-4 and accompanying text).
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Congress never intended the antitrust laws to restrict the activities of the
state, if the state is the defendant, the immunity from the antitrust laws is
absolute (with one possible, but improbable, exception 14). Nothing in the
language, rationale, or the lower federal courts' interpretation of Goldfarb55
encroaches on the absolute antitrust immunity where suit is filed directly
against the state. However, the rationale for state action immunity does not
require, and Goldfarb indicates that the Court will not grant, an absolute
immunity for state agents. Even if it were granted that Congress never intended the antitrust laws to bind the activities of a state and that one should
not restrict the actions of state agents in carrying out powers which the state
could exercise itself but has chosen to delegate, the rationale for state action
immunity no longer applies if the state agent has acted beyond his grant of
authority. The use of the antitrust laws to enjoin the actions of a state official
acting ultra vires merely prevents activity which the state never desired in
the first place.
While Goldfarb holds that a state official who acts outside of the
scope of his authorization from the state will not be immune under Parker,
the opinion gives no indication as to what a state must do to immunize its
officials. One pre-Goldfarb and two post-Goldfarb lower federal court cases

54. It is possible to argue that a state is not exempt from the antitnst laws when it exceeds
its constitutional authority since, by its very wording, Parker only exempts the state acting as a
sovereign. The argument is that by enacting an unconstitutional statute the state is not acting as
a sovereign. This argument is tenuous at best.
55. See New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974), in which
Shell Oil and others filed a counterclaim against the state of New Mexico, claiming that the
state had violated the antritrust laws by fixing prices and eliminating competition. In attempting
to demonstrate that the state was not absolutely immune from the antitrust laws, Shell cited a
series of cases in which the courts had refused to grant immunity to private corporations regulated by the state. In deciding that these suits were not relevant to a suit filed directly against
the state, the court in Petrofina said:
But these cases involved suits against allegedly private defendants who defended on
the basis that the state has authorized their anti-competitive conduct. The alleged
authorization is normally either a putative regulatory scheme or a state created
corporation intended to manage a monopoly in the public interest.
In either situation, it is necessary to determine whether the anti-competitive
result actually is a goal of the state entitled to the state's immunity rather than a
private group masquerading under the banner of "state action." Such a determination necessarily involves an inquiry into legislative motives, and courts are understandably reluctant to apply the state's immunity to private parties without a clear
indication by the state's legislature that the anti-competitive results have its sanction.
But there is no indication from those cases that the legislature must declare its
intent to supplant competition in an industry when there is no question that the
conduct is committed by the state. Since the suit here is directly against the State,
there can be no such question .... The "legislative mandate" test is useful, indeed
possibly necessary, when there is doubt if the defendant or the regulatory scheme
is really an instrument of the state. But when there is no doubt that the defendant
is the state, the "legislative mandate" analysis is unnecessary.
Id. at 389-70_
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have disagreed on the standards to be applied in making this determination.
Allegheny Uniforms v. Howard Uniform Co., 56 the one pre-Goldfarb
case to consider this issue, held that the Port Authority of Allegheny County
was not immune from antitrust liability for its part in encouraging Port Authority employees to purchase uniforms from a specific uniform manufacturer. The court stated:
In our opinion it is not every act of a state created entity that
points a way to anti-trust [sic] protection. We search the cited act
of the legislature in vain to find express language authorizing the
Port Authority to manufacture, distribute or sell uniforms to be
worn by its operators....
No case was presented, nor has any been found, which authorizes an entity created by a state legislature to act or enter into
transactions not mandated or directed by legislative enactment.
Thus, we think 57
such unmandated acts or transactions are ultra
vires and illegal.
This court required the state to expressly authorize its agent to engage in
anticompetitive conduct by stating the authorization in a statute.
A somewhat less restrictive standard is urged by the Third Circuit in
Duke and Co. v. Foerster,58 the first post-Goldfarb circuit court case. The
plaintiff had filed suit against a municipal agency, vested with the authority
to manage buildings and structures owned by Allegheny County, for conspiring to prohibit the sale of Duke products in county facilities. To this allegation the defendant interposed a defense of state action immunity. However,
the Third Circuit disagreed, stating:
We read Goldfarb as holding that, absent state authority which
demonstrates that it is the intent of the state to restrain competition in a given area, Parker-type immunity or exemption may not
be extended to anti-competitive government activities. Such an intent may be demonstrated by explicit language in state statutes, or
may be inferred from the nature of the powers and duties given to
a particular government entity. 59
This approach, less restrictive than that of Allegheny, permits a federal
court to glean state authorization not only by analyzing the wording of the
statute but also by examining the general provisions of the statute to determine whether the delegation of authority to regulate is sufficiently plenary
to allow the inference that the state intended for the regulatory agency to
use its judgment, including the decision to restrict competition.
A more extreme version of the Duke approach is presented by the Fifth
56. 384 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
57. Id. at 462-63.
58. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. Id. at 1280.
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Circuit in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 60 wherein
Louisiana Power, a utility company, charged two cities with violating the
antitrust laws. A key issue was whether the cities could claim Parker-type
immunity. In denying the immunity to the cities the court stated:
A subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt
from the operation of the antitrust laws. Rather, a district court
must ask whether the state legislature contemplated a certain type
of anticompetitive restraint. In our opinion, though, it is not
necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each act
which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the
challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent....
Whether a governmental body's actions are comprehended within
the powers granted to it by the legislature is, of course, a determination which can be made only under the specific facts in each
case. A district judge's inquiry on this point should be broad
enough to include
all evidence which might show the scope of
61
legislative intent.
To give some indication of the difference between the Allegheny standards and the Louisiana Power standards, consider the enabling statute
which granted authority to the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law in Goldfarb.62 It would be difficult to imagine a more general
grant of authority. Nonetheless, despite the fact that this statute is silent
regarding the state supreme court's authority to promulgate or enforce
minimum fee schedules (thereby failing the Allegheny test), the Louisiana
Power court stated that, under its reading of Goldfarb, the Virginia State
63
Supreme Court would have been immunized had it been sued.
Thus, the major controversy that remains after Goldfarb is an evidentiary
one: granted that the state official must demonstrate that he was authorized
to act, how can he demonstrate his authorization? On this issue, these three
decisions differ markedly. As a matter of policy the Allegheny standards may
be too harsh. One of the primary reasons a state legislature creates and
delegates power to a regulatory commission is that the legislature is not
competent to deal with (or perhaps even recognize) problems that may arise
in a given market. Imposition of the Allegheny standards requires the legislature to anticipate such problems and make an a priori determination
whether an anticompetitive solution is necessary. Such a determination may
be well beyond the expertise of a legislative body.
With respect to the Louisiana Power approach, while it must be admitted that there is some legal support for the court's reading of Goldfarb, it,

60.
61.
62.
63.

532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 434-35 (footnotes omitted).
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1974).
532 F.2d at 434 n.7.
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too, has deficiencies. There is language in Goldfarb which can be read as
suggesting that, had the Supreme Court found an express authorization from
the state supreme court to the State Bar Association, immunity would have
been granted: "[A]lthough the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advison, fee schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or
64
require the type of price floor which arose from respondents' activities."
However, such an analysis would be a non sequitur had the Supreme Court
not previously determined that the Virginia Supreme Court had received
such authorization itself in the general legislative grant of authority. The
analysis is weakened by the fact that the Supreme Court did not state that
the Virginia Supreme Court would have been immune, nor was it necessary
for the Court to reach that issue. Whether or not the state supreme court
would have been immune, the Supreme Court found that the Virginia Supreme Court had not delegated whatever authority it had vis-i-vis minimum
fee schedules to the State Bar. It was, therefore, irrelevant whether the
state supreme court actually had the requisite authorization. Thus, the
Louisiana Power interpretation of Goldfarb is not well supported. Moreover,
from a policy perspective, it is an unsatisfactory solution. Given that there is
a clear federal policy favoring competitive markets, it is dangerous to invite
regulatory commissions to abrogate this national policy without a showing of
65
clear mandate or necessity.
There is a third position based on the Supreme Court's decision in Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange66 which seems more defensible from both a
legal and policy perspective than either the Allegheny or the Louisiana
Power approaches. At the onset it should be conceded that where the state
makes clear that it wishes to authorize a state board to adopt anticompetitive
programs, the Parker rationale requires that federal courts grant immunity
to such state bodies. Thus, if indeed a state agency could satisfy the restrictive Allegheny standards, there should be no question of granting immunity.
However, where the statute is ambiguous as to the grant of authority,
there still may be instances where a state body is entitled to immunity. The
mere fact that a state legislature has created a regulatory body implies that
the legislature intended to delegate some authority to the body. Certainly,
at a very minimum the state must have intended that the regulatory body
have sufficient authority to implement and enforce regulations necessary
to make the state's regulatory program work or to achieve various goals announced by the legislature in its enabling legislation. Thus, as an alternative

64. 421 U.S. at 790.
65. It is not necessary that the clear showing of mandate come directly from the statute.
This requirement could be satisfied by examining a facet of the legislative history of the statute,
such as floor or committee debates.
66. 373 U.S. 341 (1962).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:503

to the Allegheny and Louisiana Power approaches, it is preferable that a
state body requesting immunity be first permitted to demonstrate that the
enabling legislation specifically contemplates that the body have the authority to perform the challenged act; however, even if the defendant cannot
point to some direct showing of legislative intent, it should still be accorded
immunity if the defendant can produce evidence that such anticompetitive
activities are necessary to effectuate the state's regulatory program or regulatory goals. In the event the state body can do neither, then it should be
treated as any other private defendant under the Cantor standards.
If the state agency can demonstrate that it acted in a good faith belief
that it was immune, it may be entitled to protection from treble damage
liability, thereby avoiding the argument that this approach may make public
utility commissioners afraid to act for fear of massive treble damage liability.
This procedure permits a federal court to enjoin a state regulatory body from
engaging in anticompetitive activities which are neither clearly authorized by
the state nor necessary to effectuate the state's regulatory goals.
Finally, if the state, after the injunction issues, determines that it wishes
to authorize such anticompetitive programs, it is free to enact clear enabling
legislation. Such an approach avoids the harsh consequences of the Allegheny
standards; does not interfere with clear state mandates or necessary state
programs (even in the absence of clear state mandate); avoids forcing a federal court to presume, in the absence of a clear state mandate, that a state
wishes to subvert the national free market policy engendered in the antitrust
laws; and has already been used by the Supreme Court in the parallel situation where it had to harmonize the provisions of an anticompetitive federal
67
statute with the Sherman Act.
B. Issues Remaining After Cantor
In analyzing Cantor, it was urged that Justice Stevens had set up a fourcondition test whereby a private defendant acting pursuant to state mandate
may receive immunity from the antitrust laws if (a) his actions were compelled
by the state via statute or regulation wherein the state's role in formulating
the statute or regulation was predominant, (b) the state statute or regulation
mandating the conduct is part of a regulatory scheme that is repugnant to the
antitrust laws, (c) the state's interest in maintaining the regulatory scheme is
sufficiently primary to justify thwarting the federal policy of the antitrust laws,
and (d) the granting of immunity is essential to maintenance of the regulatory
scheme. Having implied these four requirements, the Court in Cantor offered

67. See SECTION III(B)(2) infra (notes 72-100 and accompanying text) for a discussion of the
exclusive jurisdiction cases.
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guidance as to what standards were to be used in applying these conditions
only with respect to condition a. However, standards for the proper application of conditions b and c .may be gleaned from federal case law in related
fields. Unfortunately, condition d is highly "fact oriented" and must be
applied on a case-by-case basis; it is not possible to develop general guidelines
for the application of this condition. This subsection examines each of the first
three Cantor conditions in order to determine what standards the federal
courts are likely to use in applying these conditions.
1. Actions Compelled by the State
Dating from Parker, the Court has traditionally been solicitous about
granting state action immunity. Despite T-ustice Stevens' opinion that immunity for private action pursuant to state direction does not derive from
Parker, it is clear that this form of the immunity is at least a derivative of
state action immunity. However, the antitrust laws espouse an important
national policy favoring freely competitive markets. The Cantor decision
leaves no doubt that mere authorization or approval by the state of private
action will not immunize such action.
The Court has already decided that state authorization, approval,
encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity....
In each case, notwithstanding the state participationin the decision, the private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to
enable the Court to conclude that he should be held responsible
for the consequences of his decision. 68
The language of the Court leaves little doubt as to the standard to be
applied in judging the sufficiency of the first condition. The determination to
require the challenged conduct must be made by the state. One of the recurrent themes of Cantor is that the decision to maintain a light bulb exchange program was that of Detroit Edison and not of the state. 69 There is
language in the opinion to suggest that had the Michigan Public Service
Commission conducted hearings or debated the merits of a light bulb exchange program and made it clear that the state had made an independent
determination to have a light bulb exchange program (instead of merely rubber stamping the Detroit Edison proposal to have such a program), the

68. 96 S. Ct. at 3118 (emphasis added).
69. See note 30 supra.
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program would have met the first condition. Thus, it is essential that the
state make an independent decision to require the challenged conduct.
Moreover, Cantor appears to stand for the proposition that the conduct
of the private defendant must be mandated by the state to the degree that
had the defendant acted otherwise, he would have been subject to legal
sanctions. There appears to be sound reason for this requirement, despite
the fact that mere authorization should be sufficient to immunize state
agents. Since a state acts only through its agents, the legislature must be
able to delegate discretionary authority in order that state government can
function. Imposition of the Cantor standards, requiring a state legislature to
specifically order the activity of a state agent before that agent can be
granted immunity, would severely interfere with the ability of the state to
operate. However, private conduct is a different matter. Even in Parker, the
Court was adamant that a state cannot merely "give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful." 70 In order to safeguard against this excess it is
rational to require that (1) the state make the decision to require anticompetitive conduct and (2) the private defendant's activities be compelled by
state mandate.
Before the Cantor decision the lower federal courts applied inconsistent
standards to determine whether an activity was directed by the state. The
decision in Cantor will bring about a dramatic change in those circuits that
previously applied lax standards. 71

70. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
71. For examples of the types of case analyses that will be changed due to Cantor, see
Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th
Cir. 1954), wherein the Fifth Circuit stated that action by a public service commission refusing
to permit the plaintiff to rnn a power cable along the only feasible access road to a city "'immunized" the conduct of the defendant (opposing the power line and physically obstructing it)
despite the fact that the public service commission had acted on the basis of misinformation
deliberately fed to it by the defendant. The court held that since there was no legal right of
access to the road and the commission refused to grant a permit, there was no legal injury
either, and therefore the defendant, a private party, was not held liable for what otherwise was
clearly a violation of the antitrust laws. Contra, Woods Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
However, the most egregious violation of Cantor principles occurred in Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971), where the court held
that the mere authority to control a public utility was sufficient to immunize the conduct of the
utility despite the fact that the state agency with the authority to act gave no evidence that it
had ever approved of the defendant's conduct. The court stated that the silence of the state
public service commission could be interpreted as approval of the utility's behavior. See also
Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973).
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2. Repugnance of the Regulatory Scheme to the Antitrust Laws
In rejecting the argument that Congress did not intend to superimpose
the antitrust laws in an area currently regulated by the state, Justice Stevens
stated: "[M]erely because certain conduct may be subject both to state regulation and to the federal antitrust law does not necessarily mean that it must
satisfy inconsistent standards."7 2 In other words, it is incumbent upon the
private defendant to demonstrate that the standards set by his state's regulation are so repugnant to the antitrust laws that he could not meet both
requirements simultaneously. Traditionally, the federal courts would not
presume that a regulatory statute was intended to supplant the antitrust laws
unless there was a clear repugnance between the regulatory scheme and the
antitrust laws; and then, a repeal of the antitrust laws would be permitted
only to the extent necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme. This requirement had its origins in the "exclusive jurisdiction" cases. These cases
present a common scenario. For example, Congress passes a regulatory statute such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 73 vesting authority to control the activities of some industry in a regulatory agency (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission). Later, an antitrust action is filed against
some firm in the regulated industry. The firm defends by claiming that the
regulatory act was intended to supersede the antitrust laws. The court then
examines the regulatory statute to determine whether it is repugnant to the
antitrust laws and whether it is necessary to immunize the challenged conduct in order to effectuate the regulatory scheme. 74
The Cantor Court gave clear indication that it intended to incorporate
the standards used in these exclusive jurisdiction cases in determining
whether the state regulatory scheme should supersede the antitrust laws.
The mere possibility of conflict between state regulatory policy
and federal antitrust policy is an insufficient basis for implying an
exemption from the federal antitrust laws. Congress could hardly
have intended state regulatory agencies to have broader power
than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from the antitrust
laws. Therefore, assuming that there are situations in which the
existence of state regulation should give rise to an implied exemption, the standards for ascertaining the existence and scope of such
an exemption surely must be at least as severe as those applied to
75
federal regulatory legislation.
In this language the Court makes it clear that the standards for determin72. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 73 et. seq. (1970).
74. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973); United States v.
National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
75. 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
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ing when a state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust legislation
will, at a minimum, be as restrictive as those applied to federal statutes
which may conflict with the antitrust laws, and that the principles applied on
the federal side are to be used to analyze cases dealing with state legislation.
However, it is clear that the two situations are not directly analogous. The
inquiry on the federal side can include a determination of whether a subsequent congressional act overrides the prior antitrust law, while on the
state side the question is what areas did the Congress intend to leave for
state control at the time that it passed the antitrust laws. Yet, even with this
distinction in mind, it is clear that, according to Justice Stevens, we must
look to the federal cases as setting at least a minimum standard to apply to
the state laws.
Of the many federal cases considering the issue of whether a federal
regulatory statute is intended to supersede the antitrust laws, five are particularly helpful in establishing standards for determining whether the regulatory statute is repugnant: United States v. Borden Co., 76 United States v.
RCA, "" Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 7 Marnell v.
United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 9 and Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. 80
In Borden, the Court was required to consider the relationship of the
Capper-Volstead Act of 193781 and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 193782 with the Sherman Act.8 3 Both the Capper-Volstead Act and
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act created limited exceptions to the
Sherman Act, and both statutes gave a right of review to the Secretary of
Agriculture. Suit was filed by the United States against a group of dairymen
for restrictive practices that were thought to fall outside of the scope of the
exceptions created by these two statutes. In their defense the dairymen ar76. 308 U.S. 188 (1939). The inquiry in these cases is whether the regulatory scheme was so
pervasive that it empowered the agency to enforce the antitrust policies of the Sherman Act in
light of the needs of the particular regulatory scheme the agency was implementing. This did
not preclude Court review of-the agency's determination. Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309 (1963). However, it did preclude a separate and/or concurrent
court determination of the antitrust issues alone. For this reason, the agency's jurisdiction is
referred to as "primary" rather than "exclusive." See United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334,
338 (1959); 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW TREATISE §§ 19.05, 19.06 (1958). However,
once the Court determines that the agency in question has primary jurisdiction, the review will
be very limited since the Court shows a great deal of deference to the expertise of agencies in
enforcing broad and complicated regulatory systems.
77. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).

78. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
79. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
80. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).

81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1970).
82. Id. § 671.
83. The Capper-Volstead Act permitted producers of agricultural products and dairymen to
form cooperatives for express agricultural purposes, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970), and the Act also
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to ascertain whether any such cooperatives restrained
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gued that these two statutes gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Secretary of
Agriculture to determine the illegality of their practices. Beginning with
Borden, a theme appeared that would recur in each of the other exclusive
jurisdiction cases: The mere fact that a regulatory statute vests certain powers of review in an agency is an insufficient reason to conclude that that
agency's regulations should replace court review under the Sherman Act.
There must be some special reason for taking an industry out of the purview
of the antitrust laws.
Four important points emerge from this case. First, there is a strong
presumption against taking an industry outside of the purview of the Sherman Act. Second, a statute which contains an express exemption from the
Sherman Act will generally not be construed more broadly than the wording
requires. Third, in the absence of a clear policy rationale, an act which provides only limited remedies for antitrust violations will not be presumed to
supplant the broad remedies of the Sherman Act. Fourth, statutes which
give other agencies or officials the right to review specific antitrust violations
will be held to be auxiliary to the general provisions of the antitrust laws.
While the Borden decision does not delineate a specific test for determining
the inconsistency between the regulatory statute and the Sherman Act, it is
important because it establishes the general principle that, wherever possible, the Court will attempt to harmonize the regulatory act and the Sherman
Act.
However, in RCA and PanAmerican, the Court set out what has become
the most important test for determining repugnance between the Sherman
Act and conflicting regulatory statutes: the pervasiveness of the regulatory
scheme. The RCA decision involved an allegation that RCA and NBC had
coerced Westinghouse into trading one of its TV stations for one of NBC's.
In its defense NBC urged that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) had been given exclusive authority under the Federal Communications Acts4 to pass judgment on trades of TV stations using "the public interest, convenience, and necessity"8 5 as the criterion (which may include a
consideration of possible anticompetitive effects). Therefore, it was argued, if
the United States wished to attack this trade, its sole recourse was to intercede in the FCC proceeding. However, the Court held otherwise:
"In contradistinction to communication by telephone and teletrade to the extent that agriculture prices were unduly enhanced. Id. § 292. The Marketing
Agreement Act authorized the Secretary to establish orderly marketing conditions to stabilize
the purchasing power of farmers. Id. § 671. The lower court held that (a) the cooperatives
complained of were within the exclusive purview of the Secretary of Agriculture under the
Capper-Volstead Act and (b) the Marketing Agreement Act gave exclusive jurisdiction to the
Secretary to handle other violations, quashing all counts in the indictment.

84. 47 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
85. 358 U.S. at 337.
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graph, .. . the [Communications] Act recognizes that the field of
broadcasting is one of free competition. The sections dealing with
broadcasting demonstrate that Congress has not, in its regulatory
scheme, abandoned the principle of free competition as it has done
Thus, there being no pervasive regin the case of railroads ......
ulatory scheme, and no rate structures to throw out of balance,
The justifisporadic action by federal courts can work no mischief.
8 6
cation for primary jurisdiction accordingly disappears.
The pervasive-regulatory-scheme language is repeated in most of these
cases. This has become the major justification for supplanting the antitrust
laws in a regulated industry.
RCA offers little guidance as to what constitutes a pervasive regulatory
scheme because the Court failed to find that the regulatory scheme envisioned by the Federal Communications Act pertaining to television was
pervasive. However, Pan American8 7 is one of the few instances in which
the Court did find a pervasive regulatory scheme. Pan American was accused of conspiring to block another airline's application for the right to
operate north of the Canal Zone and of having divided air routes with
another airline. Pan American defended on the ground that the Federal Aviation Act 8 granted to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) plenary power to
regulate the airline industry and that imposition of the Sherman Act would
thwart the regulatory scheme contemplated by Congress. The Court agreed.
Despite cautious language stating that it was not removing the airline industry completely from the purview of the antitrust laws, the Court stated:
Limitation of routes and divisions of territories and the relation of
common carriers to air carriers are basic in this regulatory scheme.
The acts charged in this civil suit as antitrust violations are precise
ingredients of the Board's authority in granting, qualifying, or denying certificates to air carriers, in modifying, suspending, or revoking them, and in allowing or disallowing affiliations between
common carriers and air carriers. 89
In case of a prospective application of the Act, the Board's order, as noted, would give the carrier immunity from antitrust violations "insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do
anything authorized, approved, or required- by such order." § 414.
Alternatively, the board under § 411 can investigate and bring to a
halt ... all "unfair methods of competition," including those which
started prior to the Act. If the courts were to intrude independently with their construction of the antitrust laws, two regimes
might collide. 90
86. Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
87. See note 78 supra.
88. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).

89. 371 U.S. at 305.
90. Id. at 309-10.
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Apparently, the Court's rationale was that since the CAB is given plenary
power to regulate unfair trade practices as well as to regulate sundry aspects
of the airline industry, it would be unnecessary and perhaps destructive of
the CAB's regulatory practices to permit the antitrust laws to intrude upon
CAB regulation. This, by itself, gives very little guidance. It must be remembered that the FCC also has authority to deal with unfair trade practices and to regulate various aspects of the television industry. Yet, in RCA
the Court refused to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the FCC.
The real lesson of Pan American is to be found by examining the language quoted above in light of the striking differences between FCC regulation and CAB regulation. The FCC, while empowered to grant, deny, and
revoke licenses, only controls entry and exit from the market and by the
power to force unwilling exit, also controls certain forms of behavior. However, the FCC has no control over the rates charged per minute of commercial time and has only limited control over the type of programming. Regulation by the CAB is, in contrast, much more detailed. The rates charged, the
equipment used, the flight schedules, and other matters are all under the
control of the CAB. There is little competition under the current regulation
by the CAB. Thus, the major difference between the FCC and the CAB is
that the FCC is empowered to review unfair trade practices in order to
permit free competition to properly function in the market, while the CAB
reviews unfair trade practices in order to permit its own regulatory scheme
to function. The courts are quite capable of handling unfair trade practices
where the goal is free competition; nonetheless, if the goal of reviewing
trade practices is the efficient functioning of a regulatory scheme which is
peculiar to that industry and where the competitive market has been largely
supplanted by a planned market, there is little justification for permitting
anyone but the regulatory agency to review trade practices. This will be the
case whenever the regulated industry is a natural monopoly. 91
A district court decision in Marnell v. United Parcel Service of America,
Inc. 92 gives some evidence as to the interpretation of Pan American by
lower federal courts. In Marnell, the plaintiff, who engaged in the delivery
of retail packages from department stores to private homes, alleged that the
defendant United Parcel Service had engaged in conspiracies to damage the
plaintiff. As one element in its defense United Parcel Service claimed that
there was a repugnance between the antitrust laws and the regulatory policy
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 93 As support for this claim the defendant
91. The major justification for supplanting competitive standards is that the industry is a
natural monopoly. For an excellent discussion of market and production conditions which make
for a natural monopoly, see A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INsTITUTIONS (1970).
92. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
93. 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
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cited Pan American. The lower court disagreed:
This Court is of the opinion that Pan American does not support defendants in this case because ... the Interstate Commerce
Commission has not been empowered (as was the Civil Aeronautics
Board under § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act) to deal with the
"'precise ingredients" of the conduct alleged in the present
complaint-monopolization, attempted and achieved, either
by
94
cease and desist order or by an award of damages therefor.
It is difficult to harmonize this decision with that of Pan American. Under
both the Federal Aviation Act and the Interstate Commerce Act the agencies are empowered to grant or deny the common carriers access to specific
routes, to suspend fare and rates which the agency determines to be unreasonable, to review trade practices, and so on. Thus, one must search hard
to find how the regulatory scheme of the CAB differs from that of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). There is, however, one major difference which may justify the difference in treatment. Under the Interstate
Commerce Act, the ICC is prohibited from considering the goodwill or earning power of the common carrier in allowing or disallowing a tariff.95 However, the CAB is known to allocate markets, adjust routes, and set fare rates
in order to stabilize the earning power of the airlines. 96 Thus, while review
of trade practices in the trucking industry may not affect the basic structure
of the industry, any action by a federal court under the antitrust laws with
regard to the aviation industry may upset the mix of route awards, competitive advantages, and fare structure put together by the CAB in order to
permit each airline to earn a fair rate of return.
Finally, in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 97 the Supreme
Court recently indicated that the pervasive regulation test is not the only
one which can be used to demonstrate repuguance between the regulatory
statute and the Sherman Act. Gordon was a private antitrust suit against the
New York Stock Exchange, claiming that the fixed rate of stock commissions
established by the Exchange was a Sherman Act violation. The Exchange
defended on the ground that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section
19(b)(9), 98 authorized the SEC to supervise the exchanges "in respect of
such matters as . . . the fixing of reasonable rates of commission," 99 and that
this provision took the setting of commission rates outside of the purview of
the antitrust laws. In its amicus brief the United States suggested that be94. 260 F. Supp. at 405.
95. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(h) (1970).
96. For a good general discussion of regulation in the air transport industry, see L. KEYES,
FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION (1968).

97. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1970).
99. 422 U.S. at 662.
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cause there was no evidence that the Act was a pervasive regulatory scheme,
the setting of commission rates should not be immune from antitrust prosecution. The Court disagreed:
The United States appears to suggest that only if there is a
pervasive regulatory scheme, as in the public utility area, can it be
concluded that the regulatory scheme ousts the antitrust laws.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 16, 35. It is true that
in some prior cases we have been concerned with the question of
the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme as a factor in determining whether there is an implied repeal of the antitrust laws ... . In
the present case, however, respondents do not claim that repeal
should be implied because of a pervasive regulatory scheme, but
because of the specific provision of § 19(b)(9) and the regulatory
Hence, whether the Exchange Act
action thereunder ....
amounts to pervasive legislation ousting the antitrust acts is not a
question before us. 100
It is difficult to determine what the Court was implying. One possible
explanation of the decision is that the Court interpreted section 19(b)(9) as
an indication of congressional intent to vest authority with the SEC. If this is
the case, Gordon stands for nothing more than the proposition that if the
statute clearly demonstrates an intent to remove review of a procedure from
the purview of the antitrust laws, it will be removed. Such a holding is
reasonable when applied to federal statutes. However, one must be very
careful in transferring it to a case of state regulation. Cantor makes clear
that the state cannot at its whim remove private conduct from the purview
of the antitrust laws. Thus, if the state creates a statutory scheme which is
not repugnant to the antitrust laws so that imposition of both the state regulatory standard and the antitrust standards would not require the private
defendant to satisfy contradictory standards, it will not immunize the private
defendant. However, Gordon may still have some implication for this area of
immunity. It is possible to read Gordon as standing for the proposition that
a particular regulatory provision may be inconsistent with the antitrust laws
despite the fact that the regulatory scheme as a whole is not pervasive.
In synthesizing these cases it is difficult to find a consistent theme. The
Court has indicated as a general matter that it will not readily find that a
state regulatory statute displaces the antitrust laws, and the presumption is
that it does not. However, Borden suggests that statutes giving a regulatory
commission the power to investigate restraints of trade in order to permit
free market mechanisms to operate will be held auxiliary to antitrust review.
The Gordon case may further imply that a regulatory statute which recognizes anticompetitive behavior as a legal violation, but presents only limited
100. Id. at 688-89.
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remedies, will also be construed as auxiliary to the antitrust laws rather than
as replacements for them.
There is a sound basis for these legal principles. If the regulatory statute
recognizes the policy of free competition, there is no reason to fear interference with the state's regulatory system by enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Conversely, repugnance between the antitrust laws and the state's regulatory system may create two problems. First, if it is clear that the state has
empowered its regulatory commission to review various types of conduct in
order to effectuate a regulatory scheme that does not admit to free market
principles, then imposition of antitrust principles will interfere with the state
scheme. This is precisely the principle of Pan American on the federal level.
The CAB's regulation under the Federal Aviation Act has virtually eliminated free competition from the airline industry. The Act further contemplates that the CAB will control allocation of markets, fares, etc. in order
to stabilize rates of return on debt and equity in the industry. Such a complete regulatory scheme, which has in reality substituted the planning of the
CAB for free market principles, will not work if competition is infised randomly through antitrust attack. Second, even if the regulatory scheme is not
pervasive, it may be that the particular action challenged is closely related to
ratemaking or some other regulated aspect of the market. If the state has
empowered the regulatory agency to consider anticompetitive aspects of the
conduct challenged in setting rates, imposition of the antitrust laws may disrupt the rate-making process. However, this argument was raised in RCA
and the Court was not receptive.

3. Sufficiency of the State's Interest
One of the most dramatic facets of Cantor has been the infusion of
preemption concepts directly into the immunity process. In Part III of his
opinion, Justice Stevens stated: "[E]ven assuming inconsistency [between
the state statute and the antitrust laws], we could not accept the view that
the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's."'' 1 In
context, this implies that there is some private conduct pursuant to a state
statute which satisfies all of the other three Cantor criteria but will not
immunize private defendants because the state's interest in supplanting the
antitrust laws is not sufficient. This represents the first suggestion that the
test for antitrust immunity for any of the three classes of immunees contains
an element of preemption. Moreover, in his separate concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun indicated that he views Cantor solely as a preemption
case.
101. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
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Since a majority of six justices have indicated an intent to infuse preemption concepts into the immunity, it is likely that such will be done. However, the Court has not indicated what standards will be used to judge the
sufficiency of the state's interest. Justice Blackmun spoke directly to this
issue, indicating that where the state is regulating in areas that are traditionally of state concern,102 he would use a rule of reason test with a standard
like'that used for equal protection issues;10 3 that is, in those traditional areas
of state interest he would require only a showing of minimum rationality in
order to uphold the state regulation. In Cantor, Justice Blackmun determined that the light bulb exchange program was unnecessary to the state's
regulation of electricity.
However, it is at least questionable whether Justice Blackmun's standard
in Cantor is actually equivalent to the minimum rationality test under the
equal protection clause. In only one case under the equal protection clause
has the Court refused to uphold the state statute under a minimum rationality test, and that was because the state's classification was not permissible,
not because the Court quarrelled with the necessity of the state's scheme.
Even that case was recently overruled.1 0 4 In reality, it would appear that
Justice Blackmun is using a modified version of the equal protection test
wherein there is some presumption in favor of the state; however, the presumption is not as strong as in the equal protection area.
Aside from Justice Blackmun's statement, the Court does not indicate
what preemption test it will use. Presumably, unless the Court develops a
special test, it will refer to traditional preemption standards under the commerce clause. Some authorities have said that "the Court has adopted the
same weighing of interests approach in preemption cases that it uses to determine whether a state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. In a
number of situations the Court has invalidated statutes on the preemption
ground when it appeared that the state laws sought to favor local economic
10 5
interests at the expense of the interstate market."
The commerce clause cases have demonstrated that the Court will substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, consider whether the state could
achieve the same goals by other means which do not burden interstate
commerce (or in this case, the free market principles behind the antitrust
laws), consider whether there is a need for national uniformity in state regu-

102, Specifically, Justice Blackmun cited safety, health, and professional ethics standards as
traditional areas. Id. at 3127.
103. Id. at 3126-27.
104. New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976), rev'g Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457
(1957).
105. Comment, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REv. 208, 220 (1959).
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lation, and weigh state and federal interests." 6 Under this more traditional
preemption test there is a more substantial probability that state regulatory
statutes will fail to grant immunity.
However, from a policy perspective, imposition of traditional preemption
principles may well be a fiasco. In the constitutional area it appears that the
Court has retreated from a stance of substituting its judgment for that of the
state legislature in those cases which have arisen under the fourteenth
amendment due process and equal protection clauses.' 0 7 However, imposition of traditional preemption standards in antitrust immunity cases may
practically result in the courts substituting their judgment for that of the
state. Every rationale' 0 8 for abandoning this second guessing approach in the
constitutional area also applies in the antitrust area. It would appear that the
preemption element in the immunity test should not amount to more than a
consideration of whether the anticompetitive regulations of the state meet a
standard similar to the one enunciated by Justice Blackmun-minimum rationality.
4. Problems Under Cantor
The language and dicta of Cantor presage serious problems in certain
antitrust cases. Prior to Cantor there was a clear dichotomy between state
and private action. A given course of conduct was one or the other. After
Cantor this is no longer true. For example, assume that a state enacts a
statute which fixes the fees charged by lawyers for various legal services but
that the statute does not meet the Cantor standards.' 0 9 Suit is then filed
against a group of lawyers, charging them with price fixing. The lawyers
defend on the ground that they never agreed to fix prices; prices were fixed
by the state. Note this crucial distinction. The lawyers are not claiming that
the statute immunized their behavior, they are claiming that their behavior
does not constitute an antitrust violation to be immunized because the es-*
sential element of agreement is absent. Prior to Cantor this argument would
not have been available because state action immunity under Parker made it
unnecessary. If, under Parker, the action was regarded as compelled by the
106. 96 S. Ct. at 3127.
107. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
108. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,
who are elected to pass laws ....
Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to "subject the State to
an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and
wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to secure.
Id. at 730 (footnotes omitted).
109. For example, a court could find under Cantor that the state's participation in formulating the rates is not sufficient or its interest in regulating the income of its attorneys is not
adequate.
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state, then it was state action. Thus, had the lawyers' conduct not passed the
Parker immunity standards it would have been tantamount to finding the
lawyers' behavior was private, not state, action, but in either case the violation was assumed.
After Cantor, however, it is possible to have conduct mandated by the
state which will not be immunized. Justice Stevens has stated that the immunity of private action mandated by the state is no longer a pure state
action immunity. While these lawyers could not claim immunity, this does
not mean that they agreed to fix prices.
The very wording in Part IV of Cantor gives credence to this possibility.
Justice Stevens addressed himself to the issue of what might have happened
to the private parties in Parker had they been sued:
What sort of charge might have been made against the various
private persons who engaged in a variety of different activities implementing that program is unknown and unknowable because no
such charges were made. Even if the state program had been held
unlawful, such a holding would not necessarily have supported a
claim that private individuals who had merely conformed their
conduct
to an invalid program had thereby violated the Sherman
11 0
Act.
This is a puzzling statement. If the state program were unlawful, then surely
the enabling statute or regulations would fail to meet at least one of the
Cantor criteria (perhaps that the state's interest was insufficient). Yet, Justice Stevens did not say that compliance with an invalid statute might immunize these persons from treble damage liability; he stated that there
might be no claim at all that these persons violated the Sherman Act. At
least one, and perhaps the only, way in which this might occur is if the fact
that these persons were obeying a statute means that the requisite elements
of a conspiracy using the Interstate Circuit"' test are not present. Thus,
Cantor may have unwittingly opened a Pandora's box.
110. 96 S. Ct. at 3122 (emphasis added).
111. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). This case involved a suit
against a group of movie theater owners and eight movie distributors wherein the owners circulated a letter to each of the eight distributors asking that each one refuse to distribute its
movies to theater owners who would not comply with certain restrictions dealing with the
admission price and number of movies that could be shown at one time. There was little evidence that the eight distributors had previously agreed among themselves to the restrictions;
however, all eight complied with the restrictions. When later joined in this suit the distributors
urged that they had each acted independently and were not guilty of any conspiracy. However
the Supreme Court disagreed.
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited,
the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it. Each
distributor was advised that the others were asked to participate; each knew that
cooperation was essential to successful operation of the plan....
... Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to
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IV. CONCLUSION

After Cantor it appears that the Court will still recognize three separate
classes of immunees: the state, state officials, and private persons acting
under the direction of the state. However, the status of private persons
seeking the immunity has been clarified by the opinion. Not only does the
state have to mandate the action, but the four-part test created by the Court
also seems to place restrictions on the type of conduct that the state may
immunize.
The Court's test for determining whether a private defendant who
allegedly acted under the direction of the state is deserving of antitrust
immunity requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) he was acting
pursuant to a mandatory regulation or statute and that the state's role in formulating the regulation or statute is sufficiently dominant to enable a federal
court to conclude that the defendant's actions were compelled by the state;
(2) the state's statute is repugnant to the antitrust laws; (3) the state's interest in creating a statutory scheme repugnant to the antitrust laws is sufficiently primary to justify supplanting the antitrust policies; and (4) in order
to give effect to the state's regulatory scheme or to achieve the goals of that
scheme, it is necessary to immunize the conduct of the defendant.
Although the current trend, as exemplified by the Cantor decision,
seems to limit the' availability of the state action immunity by setting up a

participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint
of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.
Id. at 226-27. See also Theatre Enterprises, Inc., v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
In the context of the hypothetical concerning state fixed lawyer fees it could be argued that,
despite the lack of a concerted agreement between the lawyers under the Interstate Circuit
rationale, there was a conspiracy to the extent that each lawyer knew that he was participating
in a plan in which cooperation among all of the state's attorneys was essential and in which a
necessary consequence of the plan, if carried out, would be a restraint of interstate commerce.
This was sufficient to invoke the operation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Because the lawyers
were only following the command of the state, they would not under Justice Stevens' opinion in
Cantor, be subject to treble damage liability, only to injunction.
The courts have split on the issue of whether the conspiracy element requires that the actor
be a willing participant. This issue has arisen previously in the context of tying arrangements
where the franchisee attempts to sue its franchisor for illegal tying arrangements. The courts
have differed as to whether the franchisee is required to demonstrate that the tying arrangement was coerced. Compare FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) with Unger v. Dunkin
Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975),reo'd, 755 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) E-1 (3d Cir. 1976). If the element of conspiracy does require a willingness to cooperate, then it would seem that the lawyers could not be said to have violated the Sherman Act
because their actions were coerced by the state; however, if willingness is not required, then it
would be possible to find that the lawyers had conspired in violation of the Sherman Act.
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strict test for applicability, that same decision may presage a new flexibility
in the enforcement of the antitrust lavs by creating a dichotomy between
injunctive and treble damage relief. If the Court does take this direction,
then an important flexibility will have been created that allows the courts to
enforce the policy of the antitrust laws while being sensitive to the dilemma
of a private individual who, in good faith, is following a state mandated
course of conduct.

